Booms and busts in housing markets: determinants and implications by Agnello, L. & Schucknecht, L.
  
 
 
 
Work ing  PaPer  Ser i e S
no 1071  /  J uly  2009
BoomS and  
BuStS in houSing  
marketS 
determinantS  
and imPlicationS
by Luca Agnello
and Ludger Schuknecht
WORKING  PAPER  SER IES
NO 1071  /  JULY  2009
This paper can be downloaded without charge from
http://www.ecb.europa.eu or from the Social Science Research Network
electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1433198.
In 2009 all ECB 
publications 
feature a motif 
taken from the 
€200 banknote.
BOOMS AND BUSTS IN 
HOUSING MARKETS
DETERMINANTS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 1
by Luca Agnello 2 
and Ludger Schuknecht 3
1   We are grateful to Carsten Detken, Gerard Korteweg, an anonymous referee and participants at the European Central Bank 
seminar on booms and busts in housing markets for helpful comments. Any views expressed represent those of 
the authors and not necessarily those of the European Central Bank.
2   University of Palermo, Department of Economics, Business and Finance (SEAF), Italy; email: luca.agnello@economia.unipa.it
3   European Central Bank, Directorate General Economics, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany; 
e-mail: Ludger.Schuknecht@ecb.europa.eu
© European Central Bank, 2009
Address 
Kaiserstrasse 29 
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
Postal address 
Postfach 16 03 19 
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
Telephone 
+49 69 1344 0 
Website 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu
Fax 
+49 69 1344 6000 
All rights reserved. 
Any reproduction, publication and 
reprint in the form of a different 
publication, whether printed or 
produced electronically, in whole or in 
part, is permitted only with the explicit 
written authorisation of the ECB or the 
author(s). 
The views expressed in this paper do not 
necessarily refl ect those of the European 
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB 
Working Paper Series is available from 
the ECB website, http://www.ecb.europa.
eu/pub/scientific/wps/date/html/index.
en.html
ISSN 1725-2806 (online)
3
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1071
July 2009
Abstract 4
Non-technical summary 5
1 Introduction 7
2 Overview of the literature 9
3 Booms and busts in housing markets 11
3.1 Identifi cation of housing price 
booms and busts 11
3.2 Booms and busts in real estate 
prices since the 1970s 14
3.3 Some stylized facts on the characteristics 
of boom-bust phases 18
3.4 Cross-sectional post-boom analysis 21
4 Determinants of booms and busts in 
housing markets 23
4.1 Empirical model and hypotheses 23
4.2 Driving factors of housing markets 25
5 Empirical results 27
5.1 Elasticities of explanatory variables 33
6 Robustness checks 37
7 Concluding remarks 40
References 42
Annex 45
European Central Bank Working Paper Series 47
CONTENTS
4
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1071
July 2009
Abstract
This study looks at real estate price booms and busts in industrialised countries. It 
identifies major and persistent deviations from long term trends for 18 countries and 
estimates the probabilities of their occurrence using a Random Effects Panel Probit 
model over the period 1980-2007. It finds that 1) most recent housing booms have 
been very persistent and of a significant magnitude; 2) there appears to be a strong 
correlation between the persistence and magnitude of booms and subsequent busts; 3) 
economic costs (in terms of GDP losses during the post-boom phase) depend 
significantly on the magnitude and duration of the boom and money and credit 
developments during that period; 4) a number of policy variables, including short term 
interest rates, local and global money and credit developments, and the incidence of 
mortgage market deregulation affect significantly the probability of experiencing 
booms and busts; and 5) the model is quite successful in identifying booms and busts 
early on. 
Keywords: house prices, housing market, booms and busts. 
JEL Classification: E32, R21, R31 
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 Non-technical summary 
Looking at real estate price developments in industrialised countries since the 
1970s, we aim to address the following questions: 1) How can we identify long term 
deviations from real estate price trends (booms and busts) that are relevant from a 
macroeconomic perspective as they “distort” expectations and behaviour? 2) Do the 
characteristics of booms foreshadow those of busts? And how do more recent housing 
booms compare from a historical perspective in terms of size and persistence? 3) How 
far are boom characteristics potentially harmful for output growth? 4) What 
determines the emergence of booms and busts? 5) What is the estimated marginal 
impact of these determinants, and notably financial variables on the probabilities of 
boom and bust episodes? 6) Does this help the early identification and prevention of 
booms and busts? 
In order to address these questions, we proceed as follows. First, we identify, for a 
sample of 18 industrialized countries, boom and bust periods as major and persistent 
deviations from trend. We follow the dating approach used by Jaeger and Schuknecht 
(2007) based on the so-called triangular methodology initially proposed by Harding 
and Pagan (2002). Second, we use boom episodes in a cross-section analysis and test 
whether the behaviour of certain variables during booms can help explain output 
growth during the post-boom period. Third, in order to identify the determinants of 
booms and busts and measure their impact on the probabilities of these events, we 
estimate a Random Effects Panel Probit model over the period 1980-2007.  
The main findings can be summarized as follow:  
o The most recent housing booms have been amongst the most persistent 
in the past 40 years. The magnitude of deviations in house prices from 
long term trends has been similar as in past booms;  
o In the past, there has been a strong correlation between the persistence 
and magnitude of booms and of subsequent busts;  
o The economic costs (in terms of GDP losses during the post-boom 
phase) depend significantly on the magnitude and persistence of the 
boom and money and credit developments during this period;  
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o Past economic growth, short term interest rates, local  and global 
money and credit developments, and the incidence of mortgage market 
deregulation affect significantly the probability of experiencing booms 
and busts; 
o The estimated model allows to predict the occurrence of booms and 
busts already early on during these phases. 
As to the contribution of this study, first, our analysis suggests that, a 
probabilistic identification of booms and busts relatively early on in such phases 
seems possible on the basis of our model. In particular, for the majority of the 
countries, the model seems to perform reasonably well as early warning device for the 
identification of booms.   
Second we find that interest rate policies directly or indirectly, via its effect on 
money and credit, can have a significant influence on the probability of booms and 
busts occurring. Regulatory policies that slow down money and credit growth are also 
expected to curtail boom probabilities. Finally, the importance of global liquidity 
suggests that cross-border externalities of overly lax policies in boom periods may be 
significant.  
Nevertheless, some important caveats have to be made. First of all, the 
heterogeneity in predicting the most recent turning points experienced by some 
countries, suggests to interpret cautiously signals issued by our model. Second, we 
note that the Panel Probit model defines “only” an econometric reduced-form 
relationship between monetary variables and asset prices booms and busts.  
In spite of these limitations, we believe that our estimation results provide 
useful indications and plausible “rules of thumb” that could be part of the information 
set of the monetary and regulatory policy makers who take into account (emerging) 
housing booms in their assessment.  
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1. Introduction 
In the late1990s, a major housing boom coupled with strong money and credit 
growth emerged in the US and many other industrialised countries. This took place in 
an environment of strong financial innovation, and as it turned out, insufficient risk 
management, lack of transparency, poor incentives and increasing leverage. The turn 
from boom to bust and to crisis started with troubles in the sub-prime mortgage 
market in the US in early 2007. Initially these troubles were thought to remain well 
contained. But in the summer of 2007, the sub-prime crisis turned into a wider US 
housing market downturn and financial crisis that spilled over to Europe as the first 
wave of confidence loss in the financial sector unfolded. Following the Lehmann 
default in September 2008, the financial crisis deepened and an international recession 
emerged as confidence evaporated, banking sectors suffered increasing losses, 
housing markets turned in more countries and exports slumped in industrialised 
countries as well as emerging markets. 
The global nature of the current downturn in the context of a sharp weakening 
of the housing sector in many countries adds relevance to the broader questions 
motivating our study. Looking at real estate price developments in industrialised 
countries since the 1970s, we aim to address the following questions: 1) How can we 
identify long term deviations from real estate price trends (booms and busts) that are 
relevant from a macroeconomic perspective as they “distort” expectations and 
behaviour? 2) Do the characteristics of booms foreshadow those of busts? And how 
do more recent housing booms compare from a historical perspective in terms of size 
and persistence? 3) How far are boom characteristics potentially harmful for output 
growth? 4) What determines the emergence of booms and busts? 5) What is the 
estimated marginal impact of these determinants, and notably financial variables on 
the probabilities of boom and bust episodes? 6) Does this help the early identification 
and prevention of booms and busts? 
In order to address these questions, we proceed as follows. First, we identify, 
for a sample of 18 industrialized countries, boom and bust periods as major and 
persistent deviations from trend. We follow the dating approach used by Jaeger and 
Schuknecht (2007) based on the so-called triangular methodology initially proposed 
by Harding and Pagan (2002). Second, similar to Adalid and Detken (2007), we use 
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boom episodes in a cross-section analysis and test whether the behaviour of certain 
variables during booms can help explain output growth during the post-boom period. 
Third, in order to identify the determinants of booms and busts and measure their 
impact on the probabilities of these events, we estimate a Random Effects Panel 
Probit model over the period 1980-2007. Compared to the existing literature, we 
provide a more comprehensive approach to assess determinants of booms and busts in 
housing markets. In fact, by relying on a large set of explanatory variables, we 
provide a more accurate estimation of the linkage between economic, monetary, 
demographic variables and the occurrence of booms and busts. In particular, to our 
best knowledge, no empirical studies have investigated, in a Panel binary framework, 
the role of global liquidity in determining housing price booms and busts.  
Our main findings can be summarized as follow: 1) the most recent housing 
booms have been amongst the longest in the past 40 years. The magnitude of 
deviations in house prices from long term trends has been similar as in past booms; 2) 
In the past, there has been a strong correlation between the persistence and magnitude 
of booms and of subsequent busts; 3) we find that the economic costs (in terms of 
GDP losses during the post-boom phase) depend significantly on the magnitude and 
persistence of the boom and money and credit developments during the boom; 4) The 
estimated elasticities computed from the Panel Probit model, suggest that past 
economic growth, short term interest rates, local and global money and credit 
developments and the incidence of mortgage market deregulation affect significantly 
the probability of experiencing booms and busts; and 5) our model is successful in 
identifying booms and busts already early on.  
We believe that this paper’s analysis and implications are a relevant 
contribution to the academic and political debate. First, our analysis suggests that, a 
probabilistic identification of booms and busts relatively early on in such phases 
seems possible on the basis of our model. In particular, for the majority of the 
countries, the model seems to perform reasonably well as early warning device for the 
identification of booms. Second we find that interest rate policies directly or 
indirectly, via its effect on money and credit, can have a significant influence on the 
probability of booms and busts occurring. Regulatory policies that slow down money 
and credit growth are also expected to curtail boom probabilities. Finally, the 
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importance of global liquidity suggests that cross-border externalities of overly lax 
policies in boom periods may be significant.  
Nevertheless, some important caveats are warranted. First, the heterogeneity in 
predicting the most recent turning points experienced by some countries, suggests to 
interpret cautiously signals issued by our model. Second, we note that the Panel Probit 
model defines “only” an econometric reduced-form relationship between monetary 
variables and asset prices booms and busts.1  
In spite of these limitations, we believe that our estimation results provide 
useful indications and plausible “rules of thumb” that should be regarded as part of 
the information set of the monetary and regulatory policy makers who take into 
account emerging housing booms in their assessment.  
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
review of the literature. Section 3 deals with the identification of boom and bust 
episodes in housing markets and puts recent experiences into a historical perspective. 
Moreover, it provides some stylised facts on boom and bust characteristics across 
countries and examines the relation between boom characteristics and post-boom 
economic performance. Section 4 presents the econometric approach used to estimate 
the probabilities of boom and bust phases. Section 5 contains the empirical results and 
focuses on the marginal impact of each driving factors of housing prices on boom and 
bust probabilities. Section 6 presents a robustness analysis while section 7 concludes 
and provides some policy considerations. 
 
2. Overview of the literature 
 
The study touches on two strands of literature, i.e. the literature that analyses 
the determinants of housing prices and, second, the one that links asset prices, 
macroeconomic developments and economic policies. As to the first question, the 
empirical literature is vast. Cross- or multi-country studies generally find that real 
estate prices are driven by income growth and interest rates (see for example Kennedy 
and Andersen, 1994, Englund and Ioannides, 1997, Kasparova and White, 2001). 
                                                 
1 A complete structural model would be better suited to throw light on the effective interaction between 
monetary policy and asset prices and therefore, to judge the appropriateness of monetary and regulatory 
policies to address financial imbalances. 
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Other financial variables and, in particular bank credit, have also been considered on 
the grounds that there may be credit rationing (e.g. Tsatsaronis and Zhu, 2004; IMF, 
2004; Lecat and Mésonnier 2005). Some authors examine the impact of the regulatory 
framework of housing finance on housing prices. For instance, Muellbauer and 
Murphy (1997) and Iacovello and Minetti (2003) argue that financial liberalization of 
mortgage markets led to a significant increase of  the sensitivity of house prices to 
short term interest rates.  
Regarding the relationship between between asset prices, macroeconomic 
developments and economic policy a number of empirical studies has emerged in 
recent years that looks at various aspects mostly under the label of “booms” and 
“busts” (for a survey of transmission channels and empirical studies, see Gerdesmeier, 
Reimers and Roffia, 2009).2 Bordo and Jeanne (2002) and Borio and Lowe (2002) 
look at the relation between asset prices booms and busts and the conduct of monetary 
policies. In particular, they consider the potential cases for proactive versus reactive 
monetary policy based on the situation where asset price reversals can have serious 
effects on real output. Detken and Smets (2004) and Detken and Alessi (2009) look at 
monetary policy developments during asset price booms and busts with particular 
emphasis on identifying high and low cost busts and developing early warning 
indicators. Jaeger and Schuknecht (2007) assess the fiscal policy stance during boom-
bust phases in asset prices. They find a strong reaction of fiscal revenue to asset price 
cycles which results in a ratcheting up public expenditure in booms and public debt in 
busts. Jonung, Schuknecht and Tujula (2009) compare the experience of the Nordics 
in the early 1990s with other episodes where a strong role of financial variables in an 
environment of financial innovation is found. Martin, Schuknecht and Vansteenkiste 
(2007) analyse booms and busts in asset prices between the 1970s and early 2000s 
and find evidence of macroeconomic and, especially, financial variables in explaining 
the emergence of booms and busts and the choice of exchange regime during the bust 
                                                 
2 From a more theoretical perspective, the explanation of boom bust cycles is rather complex. One 
could argue that financial accelerator phenomena (Bernanke et al., 1999) involving the credit and bank 
lending channel coupled with feedback loops between expectations and outcomes and structural 
financial sector problems in an environment of strong financial innovation (as surveyed, for instance in 
Papademos, 2008), as well as wealth effects from the housing boom (Slacalek, 2006; Skudelny, 2008) 
can help conceptualise the excesses and imbalances that emerge in a boom. These are now unwinding 
in the bust. Low interest rates can further exacerbate booms via banks taking on more risks (Alessi and 
Detken, 2009 and Borio and Zhou, 2007).  
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phase. These studies’ findings are broadly consistent with the recent ones by Reinhard 
and Rogoff (2008a and 2008b) who look at financial crisis episodes more globally.  
A number of studies looks at real estate prices jointly with equity prices to 
examine the question of whether credit growth – and other variables reflecting 
monetary conditions – result in broader asset price “booms” (see e.g. Detken and 
Smets, 2004; Borio and McGuire, 2004). Gerdesmeier, Reimers and Roffia (2009) 
construct a composite (house and stock market-based) asset price indicator and apply 
a pooled probit-type analysis. Credit aggregates, nominal long term interest rates and 
investment jointly with asset price dynamics prove to be the best indicators to forecast 
financial crisis. A few recent studies investigate the connection between asset prices 
movements and global liquidity trying to quantify the effects of liquidity spillovers 
(Adalid and Detken, 2007; Greiber and Setzer, 2007; Belke, Orth and Setzer, 2008). 
 
 
3. Booms and busts in housing markets 
 
3.1. Identification of housing price booms and busts 
The objective of this section is to identify booms and busts in real estate prices 
defined as major, persistent deviations from long term trends. The analysis is based on 
real housing prices data as provided by the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) for 
the period 1970-2007 for the following 18 industrialised countries: United Kingdom, 
United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway, 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium and 
Sweden. 
In the empirical literature, however, a commonly accepted method to identify 
boom and bust episodes does not exist. A good methodology should be simple, 
reasonably objective and yield plausible results. Different methods for constructing 
chronologies of booms and busts for various economic series have been used. For 
example, Bordo and Jeanne (2002) and Borio and Lowe (2002) detect a boom or  bust 
in asset price series when its three-year moving average of the growth rate falls 
outside a confidence interval defined by reference to the historical first and second 
moments of the series. Detken and Smets (2004) and Adalid and Detken (2007) define 
asset price booms as a period in which real asset prices are more than 10 percent 
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above an estimated trend. This latter is calculated recursively using a one-sided 
Hodrick-Prescott filter with a very high smoothing parameter.3 
 In our study, we identify boom and bust periods in real housing prices by 
following a dating approach similar to that initially proposed by Harding and Pagan 
(2002) and used by Jaeger and Schuknecht (2007) to construct the chronology of 
boom-bust phases in real asset prices. We consider this method to be informative 
because it focuses on major long term deviations in real house prices from trend. Such 
deviations are likely to have the more significant “distortionary” effects on individual 
behaviour and the macroeconomy. For example, the persistence (and not just the 
magnitude) of above-trend house price increases may induce house owners (and their 
creditors) to see such developments as permanent and fundamentals driven (and 
accordingly adjust their investment, consumption and lending behaviour). An effect 
on expectations is more likely to occur when deviations last, say, 7 years than when 
they persist for only 2-3 years. A potential advantage of our method is also that it may  
lead to reasonable results without requiring particular ‘ad hoc’ censoring rules 
superimposed by the econometrician.4 This is partly achieved by using annual data in 
the identification as annual data does not require as much “cleaning” of short term 
volatility via censoring rules. 5 The drawback is of course, that additional information 
contained in quarterly indicators is lost, even though from a long term, behavioural 
perspective the “real” information loss may be rather limited. 
The identification approach, used in our analysis, is based on the so-called 
triangular methodology and it consists of five steps : a) detrending of the existing real 
estate price series, b) determination of a potential set of turning points, i.e. peaks and 
troughs in the house price series; c) computation of the persistence of the period from 
trough to peak (the upswing) and from peak to trough (the downturn) and the 
magnitude of the price changes over these periods; d) the computation of  the 
                                                 
3 More specifically, Detken and Smets (2004) use annual data and set Ȝ=100, while Adalid and Detken 
(2007) use quarterly data and set Ȝ=100000. 
4 Such ad hoc rules include, for example, the choice of the length of the window to compute the 
moving average of the growth rate of the series as in Bordo and Jeanne (2002) or the selection of the 
threshold levels to disentangle between different cyclical phases.  
5 By using annual data instead of quarterly ones, we circumvent the problem of detecting a large 
number of interruptions in housing price series and identifying a large number of small-size booms and 
busts. This, in turn, would be inconsistent with our presumption that major and persistent deviations 
from long-term trends are of greatest macroecomic relevance.  To be consistent with our motivation, 
we have also decided to employ the HP-filter on ex-post data instead of the recursive HP-filter as in 
Adalid and Detken (2007). By using this latter method, we would run the risk to identify small and 
shorter-term fluctuations in housing prices as booms or busts. 
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cumulative changes in house prices during each phase (upswings and downturns) 
using the ‘triangular approximation’ method and finally e) to separate “booms” and 
“busts” from more normal housing price cycles.  
 
Notes: *Annual US housing price (log) on right axis. Housing price gap xt  on the left axis. Sample: 1970-2007 
Following this five-step procedure (see Figure 1), we first compute the housing 
price gap xt by de-trending the annual real house price series (in log) using the HP-
filtering method and assuming a very high smoothing parameter (Ȝ=10000). By doing 
so, we try to implicitly account for the long-run driving forces (observable and 
unobservable) of real housing prices.6 
We assume that a sequence ^ `0,0 1 '!' tt xx  identifies a local peak (P) in 
the series occurring at time t, while a housing price growth rate sequence 
^ `0,0 1 !'' tt xx  identifies a local trough (T) occurring at time t.  For each phase i 
(trough-to-peak and peak-to-trough), we compute the persistence or duration (Di) and 
the magnitude (Ai). The former is computed as the number of periods (years, in our 
case) from trough to peak (the upswing) and from peak to trough (the downturn) 
while the magnitude is measured as the size of change in house prices switching from 
P to T and from T to P.  
                                                 
6 We employ an HP-filter on ex-post data instead of the recursive HP-filter for the following reasons:  
1) the limited number of observations available (we have only data from 1970 to 2007, i.e., 37 years of 
observations makes it impossible to reasonably set a window (such that t<37) to initialize the recursive 
approach. 2) The objective is to maintain unchanged along the length of our sample the definition of 
booms and busts as major, persistent deviations from long term trends. Assuming to employ the 
recursive HP-filtering method, we run the risk to identify small fluctuations in housing prices as booms 
or busts. In addition, the definition of the dependent binary variable of the Panel Probit model would 
change over time thereby undermining the analysis concerning the determinants of booms and busts. 
Figure 1. US Housing market 
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By using the triangle approximation method, we consider each housing price 
phase as a triangle where the height is the magnitude and the base is the 
persistence/duration. Therefore, an approximation of the cumulative changes 
(gains/losses) within each phase (P-T and T-P) could be computed 
as   5.0uu iii ADC .7  
 Finally, after collecting separately the values of Ci computed for both 
“cyclical” phases, we identify “booms” and “busts” as those episodes which 
correspond to the first quartile from the empirical distributions of the cumulative 
changes in housing prices for all countries. By doing so, we are able to separate 
booms and busts from more normal housing prices movements. This also implies that 
a boom is not necessarily followed by a bust, and vice versa. 
 
3.2 Booms and busts in real estate prices since the 1970s 
By applying the above-discussed methodology to real annual residential 
property prices series for 18 industrialized countries over the period 1970-2007, we 
arrive at roughly 100 periods each of real estate price increases and declines. Of these 
we rank the “top” twenty-five each as housing prices boom and bust episodes. 
The identified boom and bust episodes, and their persistence, magnitude and 
severity indicators (i.e.   5.0uu iii ADC ) are reported in Table 1. Figure 2 
visualises boom and bust phases (shaded light and dark) as compared to “normal” 
periods (non-shaded) over time and across countries. 
 
                                                 
7 Note that this approach puts much weight on persistence. As explained above, this could be justified 
by arguing that it is not just the magnitude but also the persistence of booms and bust that affects 
expectations and behaviour. 
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Table 1. Industrial countries: Identified Boom and Bust phases in Real housing prices  
 
Boom Phases Bust Phases 
Country Years Persistence Magnitude Severity indicator* Country Years Persistence
 Magnitude Severity indicator* 
Sweden 1997-2007 11 67.08 368.929 Japan 1992-2006 15 -45.47 -341.055 
France 1998-2006 9 51.36 231.112 Netherlands 1979-1985 7 -78.95 -276.339 
United kingdom 1997-2004 8 47.58 190.333 Switzerland 1990-1999 10 -44.17 -220.842 
Netherlands 1971-1978 8 47.09 188.380 Ireland 1980-1987 8 -50.93 -203.702 
Spain 1986-1991 6 62.55 187.664 Norway 1987-1993 7 -57.59 -201.556 
United States 1998-2005 8 41.95 167.793 United Kingdom 1990-1996 7 -56.85 -198.991 
Norway 1994-2001 8 40.73 162.914 Belgium 1980-1985 6 -58.06 -174.184 
United Kingdom 1983-1989 7 43.31 151.592 New Zealand 1975-1980 6 -53.48 -160.434 
Spain 1999-2006 8 37.19 148.766 Denmark 1987-1993 7 -45.42 -158.977 
Italy 1999-2007 9 32.67 147.010 Spain 1992-1998 7 -44.64 -156.233 
New Zealand 2002-2007 6 48.76 146.279 Finland 1990-1993 4 -71.45 -142.892 
Denmark 1994-2001 8 34.36 137.422 Sweden 1980-1985 6 -44.48 -133.432 
Australia 1998-2004 7 36.97 129.410 Italy 1993-1998 6 -40.36 -121.084 
Canada 2001-2007 7 36.93 129.264 Italy 1982-1986 5 -47.12 -117.791 
Ireland 1995-2000 6 40.56 121.674 France 1991-1997 7 -30.05 -105.188 
Switzerland 1983-1989 7 34.70 121.459 Spain 1979-1982 4 -52.38 -104.754 
Italy 1987-1992 6 40.12 120.354 Finland 1974-1979 6 -33.00 -99.002 
Netherlands 1996-2001 6 31.10 93.311 United States 1990-1997 8 -24.17 -96.672 
Japan 1986-1991 6 27.42 82.267 United kingdom 1974-1977 4 -47.48 -94.955 
Canada 1986-1989 4 37.64 75.280 Norway 1975-1983 9 -20.15 -90.684 
Denmark 1983-1986 4 37.58 75.167 Denmark 1979-1982 4 -42.76 -85.514 
Sweden 1986-1990 5 29.87 74.687 Japan 1974-1978 5 -33.97 -84.922 
Finland 1996-2000 5 27.40 68.494 France 1981-1985 5 -26.02 -65.054 
Finland 2002-2007 6 22.35 67.048 Germany 2000-2007 8 -14.11 -56.455 
Finland 1987-1989 3 44.41 66.611 Sweden 1991-1993 3 -35.61 -53.408 
Averages  7 40.07 138.129   7 -43.95 -141.765 
Notes: * computed using triangular approximation. Sample: 1970-2007. 
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Note: Shaded dark area denote bust phases while the light ones indicate boom phases. Housing price gaps are computed as the 
deviations of the real housing prices from trend obtained using HP filter (Ȝ=10000) 
 
The past decade has seen many of the most persistent and severe booms since 
the 1970s: 15 of the “top 25” booms identified occurred during the period since the 
mid-1990s. In fact, only Japan, Germany and Belgium do not report housing booms in 
Figure 2. Housing prices gaps and Boom and Bust Phases. Period: 1971-2007. 
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the past decade. Sweden’s boom from 1997 to 2007 lasted 11 years and resulted in an 
above-trend increase of house prices by 67%. France follows with an above-trend 
increase by over 50% over nine years. Spain and the UK are represented twice in the 
“top 10” of the “boom severity league”. The magnitude of house price increases 
beyond trend ranged from 22% to 67% and the duration from 3 to 11 years. Japan’s 
famous boom of 1980s has a surprisingly low boom severity score but this is mainly 
due to the fact that it was part of a longer boom that had started in the late 1970s and 
that was briefly interrupted in the early 1980s recession.8 
Of the 25 busts, about half occurred in the early to mid-1990s. In the case of 
Japan, the bust lasted until 2006 and house price declining by about 45% as compared 
to the trend. The remaining busts seem more scattered over the previous 20 years. The 
Dutch bust around 1980 and the Finnish one from the early 1990s were the deepest 
with a fall by over 70% from peak to trough. 
The pattern of booms and busts as visualised in Figure 2 yields some more 
interesting results. The largest group of countries (8) could be called “repeated boom 
busters”: the Nordics and the large European countries except Germany (i.e., 
Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK). Another three 
countries, Australia, Canada and the US could be called “new boomers”. Six 
countries, including Japan, Switzerland, New Zealand, Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Belgium could be labelled “long cyclers” where the Dutch boom already came to an 
end a few years ago and the upswing in Belgium is too slow and interrupted to be 
statistically labelled as a boom. Germany seems to be the odd country out where 
house prices have been relatively stable and even the recent drawn-out bust has been 
relatively shallow. 
The period since the mid-1980s seems to feature more countries affected and 
more synchronicity across countries than the period before: booms in the late 1980s 
were often followed by busts in the early to mid-1990s. A renewed boom since the 
late 1990s occurred in most of these and a further number of countries. Recent booms 
have not only affected the most countries; the group also includes the US and hence 
                                                 
8 While the use of annual data reduces noise from short term “interruptions” of long term trends, such 
interruptions may still occur, as was the case in Japan and in few other countries more recently. This 
constitutes an important shortcoming of our identification method and occasionally leads to an 
underestimation of the “true” persistence of booms and busts. This has to be weighed against the costs 
and benefits of using further “ad hoc” rules and techniques.   
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the country of most global relevance. Furthermore, the most recent booms have been 
longer (6-11 years instead of 3-8 previously). If it had not been for short interruptions 
(around 2001 when the dot-com bubble burst and economic growth slowed), we 
would have seen “mega-booms” in Ireland, Denmark, Finland and Norway lasting 
about 15 years. The most recent busts have also been longer than earlier ones with 
Japan’s 15 years followed closely by Switzerland’s ten and Germany’s eight.  
 
3.3. Some stylized facts on the characteristics of boom-bust phases 
Turning in some more detail to the results from our identification procedure, 
we find that, over the period 1970-2007, nine out of twenty-five identified boom 
episodes were immediately followed by busts. In Table 2, information on the 
persistence, magnitude and severity of booms and busts is complemented by a 
measure of their relative size (computed as the difference between boom and bust 
severity indicators). For Japan, we report boom indicators for both the identified 
period (JP) and the long term upswing in the real estate market that already started in 
1979 and that was briefly interrupted in the mid-1980s (JP2, shaded). The last three 
columns of the table report the average values of a core set of macroeconomic 
variables during the selected boom and bust episodes.  
When comparing experiences during booms with those during busts over the 
nine “full” cycles in our sample, a number of interesting patterns emerge. First, the 
persistence and magnitude (and, thereby, the severity indicators) are highly correlated 
or, in other words, long and severe booms tend to be followed by long and severe 
busts. This is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 and it holds particularly strongly when 
considering the extended Japanese boom period (JT2). Moreover, bust episodes 
mostly tend to be equally long or slightly longer and of an equal or higher magnitude 
than boom episodes.  Only in two cases is the overall severity indicator in the late 
1980s boom larger than in the subsequent bust (Spain and Sweden).  
The last three columns of Table 2 illustrate the marked difference in certain 
macroeconomic variables across boom and bust episodes. On average, real per capita 
growth was almost 3% lower during busts than during booms. Given an average bust 
length of 7.3 years, this translates into a relative output loss of about 20% of GDP (or 
10% if one takes the average of boom and bust real growth as a proxy of the long term 
trend). The most significant difference is in real credit growth which had averaged 
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about 7% during the boom before falling to -2.2% in the bust. More than half the 
countries reported negative growth during the busts when excess leverage of the boom 
was reversed. Short term interest rates were on average almost 2% higher during 
booms than during busts but the picture is more diverse. 
Table 2. Boom-bust phases in industrialized countries over the period 1970-2007  
      Averages values over the boom/bust periods  
Country  Years Persistence Magnitude Severity indicator* 
Real per 
capita 
GDP 
(growth) 
Short-
term 
interest 
rates 
Real 
credit 
(growth) 
United kingdom (UK) boom 1983-1989 7 43.31 151.59 3.41 11.02 16.29 
 bust 1990-1996 7 -56.85 -198.99 1.41 8.55 0.42 
 Difference   -47.4 -2.00 -2.47 -15.87 
Japan (JP) Boom 1986-1991 6 27.42 82.27 4.02 5.74 3.87 
 Bust 1992-2006 15 -45.47 -341.06 0.99 0.92 -3.78 
 Difference   -258.79 -3.03 -4.82 -7.65 
Japan (JP2) Boom 1979-1991 13 45.19 293.75 3.27 6.59 2.89 
Bust 1992-2006 15 -45.47 -341.06 0.99 0.92 -3.78 
Difference -47.30 -2.28 -5.67 -6.67 
Switzerland (CH) Boom 1983-1989 7 34.70 121.46 1.97 3.33 3.56 
 Bust 1990-1999 10 -44.17 -220.84 0.44 4.04 0.44 
 Difference   -99.38 -1.53 0.71 -3.12 
Denmark (DK) Boom 1983-1986 4 37.58 75.17 3.86 10.62 10.15 
 Bust 1987-1993 7 -45.42 -158.98 0.57 10.2 -6.97 
 Difference   -83.81 -3.29 -0.42 -17.12 
Finland (FI) Boom 1987-1989 3 44.41 66.61 4.27 10.85 7.55 
 Bust 1990-1993 4 -71.45 -142.89 -3.28 10.02 -0.25 
 Difference   -76.28 -7.55 -0.83 -7.80 
Netherlands (NL) boom 1971-1978 8 47.10 188.38 2.35 6.09 6.93 
 bust 1979-1985 7 -78.95 -276.34 0.9 8.31 1.08 
 Difference   -87.96 -1.45 2.22 -5.85 
Italy (IT) Boom 1987-1992 6 40.12 120.35 2.43 12.2 2.96 
 Bust 1993-1998 6 -40.36 -121.08 1.36 8.31 -0.71 
 Difference   -0.73 -1.07 -3.89 -3.67 
Spain (ES) Boom 1986-1991 6 62.55 187.66 3.86 13.76 2.9 
 Bust 1992-1998 7 -44.64 -156.23 1.99 8.5 0.89 
 Difference   31.43 -1.87 -5.26 -2.01 
Sweden (SE) Boom 1986-1990 5 29.87 74.69 1.98 9.1 7.66 
 Bust 1991-1993 3 -35.61 -53.41 -2.05 7.67 -10.9 
 Difference    21.28 -4.03 -1.43 -18.56 
Averages Boom  5.8 40.79 118.69 3.13 9.19 6.87
 Bust  7.3 -51.44 -185.54 0.26 7.39 -2.20
 Difference  1.5 -10.65 -66.85 -2.87 -1.80 -9.07 
Ad memoriam:  Latest Booms (Average)  7.5 39.80 153.98 2.67 4.04 6.58 
Note: For Japan, we also compute the cumulative housing price changes by assuming a unique long boom phase during the period  1979-1991. 
Average values are based on Japan (JP) data. Characteristics of the latest booms episodes are computed as average values of the most recent boom 
episodes experienced by the following countries: Sweden, France, U.K. , U.S., Norway, Spain, Italy, New Zealand, Denmark, Australia, Canada, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Finland. 
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Figures 3a and 3b illustrate what could be expected in the current post-boom 
phases if the experience of the earlier cycles is of relevance: long and/or severe booms 
are followed by long and/or severe busts. Recent booms have mostly been on the long 
side (averaging 7.5 years) and of a similar magnitude as earlier booms so that the 
overall severity indicator is somewhat higher. When looking at recent boom episodes, 
it is also noteworthy that average real per capita economic growth and credit growth 
did not differ much from the boom part of the earlier real estate price cycles.  
Figure 3a. Durations of  boom (horizontal axis) and bust (vertical axis) periods. 
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Note: The non-dotted trend line and “JP2” reflects the extended Japanese boom phase. The 
dotted line and “JP” denotes the trend when the “short” boom for Japan is considered.   
 
    Figure 3b. Cumulative gains (horizontal axis) and losses (vertical axis) 
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Note: See Figure 3a.   
 
If past experiences provide guidance, a similar pattern could be expected for 
the current post-boom periods as for earlier ones: real per capita GDP growth would  
be very low and real credit growth distinctly negative over the average of the bust that 
could last for the best part of a decade. However, it is also conceivable that the global 
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nature of the current downturn and the rapid deleveraging and balance sheet repair 
that appears to be taking place at the time of writing of this article leads to a shorter 
though deeper bust. 
 
3.4 Cross-sectional Post-boom analysis 
 
In this sub-section, we test whether the behaviour of certain variables during 
booms can help explain output growth during the post-boom period. In particular, we 
are interested to test whether the cost associated with boom phases (that materialise in 
busts as output losses) are related to the characteristics of and notably credit 
developments during these periods. To that end, similar to Adalid and Detken (2007), 
we estimate the following cross-section equation: 
     HEEEEE   CRMagPerboomyboomposty nrnr 43210                      (1) 
 
where n are the twenty-five real estate boom episodes identified in Table 1, 
 boompostyr   is the three-years average real GDP growth in the post-boom period 
while  boomyr  indicates the average real GDP growth during the boom periods.  
The variable Per and Mag denote the persistence and the magnitude of the boom 
episodes, respectively. CR is the average real growth rate of credit (to private sector) 
during the boom periods. We note that, when the boom phases end in 2006 or 2007, 
the post-boom real GDP cannot be computed. In these cases, we calculate the 
dependent variable of equation (1), by using the latest European Commission 
projections of real GDP (AMECO dataset; January 2009 forecast). 
Results from equation (1) are reported in Table 3a, columns 1-2. In addition, 
to cross-check the robustness of our conclusions, we test whether the characteristics of 
other less severe asset price upswings influence the output growth rate during the 
following downturn period by re-estimating model (1) with the “next” 25 episodes out 
of the 100 identified via the dating approach described in section 3.1. Results are 
reported in columns 3-4. Table 3b provides some descriptive statistics on the top 25 
boom episodes and the “next” 25. 
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Dependent variable: Three-years average post-boom real GDP (growth)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Avg. Boom Real GDP (growth) 0.8949*** 0.8918*** 0.1127 0.1248 
 [0.1374] [0.1255] [0.2537] [0.2573] 
Duration  of the boom (Per) 0.7034*** 0.8124*** 0.1549 0.1552 
 [0.2172] [0.2346] [0.4301] [0.4399] 
Magnitude of the boom (Mag)  -0.0507* -0.0501* -0.0734* -0.0627 
 [0.0260] [0.0255] [0.0420] [0.0437] 
Avg. Credit growth rate during boom -0.1056*** - 0.0561 - 
 [0.0366] - [0.0816] - 
Cum. Credit growth rate during boom - -0.0154*** - 0.0121 
 - [0.0053] - [0.0183] 
Constant -4.0991*** -4.8400*** 1.7482 1.502 
 [1.2724] [1.2770] [3.2619] [3.5788] 
Observations Top 25 Top 25 Next 25 Next 25 
R-square 0.63 0.63 0.16 0.15 
Note: OLS estimation. Robust standard error in square brackets. Avg. indicate the value.* significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%..   
 
Estimates reported in columns 1-2 seem to confirm our hypothesis regarding 
the influence of boom characteristics on post-boom growth rate. We find that a ‘level
shift’ effect may help explain the positive sign of the estimated coefficient 1Eˆ . 
Countries that experienced higher growth during the boom are also likely to expect 
higher growth during the bust. Or in other words, growth does not decline by less in 
countries with low growth during the boom. One explanation could be that this 
reflects conditional convergence or catching up growth. The positive coefficient 
for 2Eˆ  may point to a “persistence” effect in that countries with a drawn out boom 
experience also a slower reversal of the growth pattern than countries with a shorter 
(but potentially steeper) boom. It is consistent with earlier findings in the literature, 
that drawn out booms were followed by shallower but more persistent downturns 
while short booms tended to be followed by short and deep busts (see e.g., Jaeger, 
Schuknecht, 2007). 
In addition, we find that the coefficient 3Eˆ  reflecting the magnitude of the 
boom is significant and negatively correlated with post-boom growth. In other words, 
a more significant overshooting in real estate prices in boom periods is correlated with 
lower post-boom growth as real estate prices and other imbalances need to adjust 
more. Finally, the estimated coefficient 4Eˆ , associated with the growth rate of private 
Table 3a. Regression explaining the post-boom Real GDP developments. 
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credit, is also negative and statistically significant. This means that the larger credit 
growth over the boom phase, the more lacklustre is the real GDP growth in the post-
boom phase. This evidence also holds when we consider the cumulated credit growth 
rate instead of the average growth rate (see column 2). This finding would be 
consistent with the need for greater deleveraging/balance sheet repair in countries that 
experienced stronger credit booms in the boom.  
Looking at the results reported in column 3-4, we note that all the explanatory 
variables are not statistically significant. This evidence corroborates our previous 
empirical findings and the claim that the identified booms are “different” and non-
linearities are at work. Given the small number of observations, however, results need 
to be interpreted cautiously. 
 Top 25 Next 25 
Avg. three-years average post-boom real GDP (growth)  1.06 1.46 
   
Avg. Boom Real GDP (growth) 3.50 3.51 
   
Duration  of the boom (Per) 6.72 4.36 
   
Magnitude of the boom (Mag)  40.07 23.08 
   
Avg. Credit growth rate during boom 6.36 5.89 
   
Cum. Credit growth rate during boom 44.03 23.40 
   
Note: average values. 
 
4. Determinants of booms and busts in housing markets 
In this section, we examine the determinants of booms and busts in real estate 
markets and, thereby, indirectly also the question of the identification of factors that 
can serve as an early warning for booms and busts. To that end, we use an 
econometric approach that allows a) to assess which factors better predict boom and 
bust episodes and b) to measure the impact of each identified factor on the response 
conditional probabilities of these events.   
4.1 Empirical model and hypotheses 
In order to examine the determinants and the predictability of boom and bust 
cycles, we estimate a Random Effects Probit model for a panel of 18 industrialized 
Table 3b. Boom and non-boom characteristics  
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countries over the period 1980-2007.9 Specifically, we estimate separately two models 
that look at boom versus non-boom and at bust versus non-bust phases.  
From a theoretical point of view, the use of a binary modelling approach in a 
Panel framework allows to capture potential “trigger effects” in housing markets due 
to their common degree of cyclicality and synchronization and, at the same time, to 
examine the probabilities of simultaneous booms or busts in different real estate 
markets.  
From an econometric point of view, using a panel approach has several 
advantages. Considering that, for each country, the number of identified boom and 
bust episodes is small, the estimation of a binary model on a country-by-country basis 
is not recommended since the robustness of the results would be questionable. The 
panel nature of the data usually provides an increased number of data points 
generating additional degrees of freedom, which presumably leads to more efficient 
estimation. Moreover, incorporating information related to both cross-section and 
time series variables can substantially diminish the problems that arise when there is 
an omitted variable problem. On the other hand, the strategy to estimate a pooled 
regression model imposes uniformity on the conditional probability responses to the 
explanatory variables across countries, which is a rather restrictive assumption. 
Starting from these premises, we estimate the following Panel Probit model: 
           N,iTtvy itiitit ,,,'X'*  1     1    11     DE                                 (2)           
°¯
°®­ d
! 
0 if 0
0 if 1
*
*
it
it
it y
yy  
where *ity  is the latent variable (incidence of booms or busts) for which we observe 
only its realisation, ity . This latter variable receives the value of zero or one 
depending on whether a boom or bust has occurred or not.10 'itX  is a vector of 
regressors, i.e. the set of common driving factors explaining the boom/bust phases. To 
avoid potential endogeneity problems, lagged explanatory variables are used ( 'X 1it ) 
                                                 
9 Other approaches can be found in literature. For instance, the signal approach is used, among others, 
by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinharrt (1998) and Alessi and Detken (2009).   
10 In the case of the boom model, all non-boom periods receive a value of zero. In the case of the bust 
model, all non-bust periods receive the value of zero. 
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in place of contemporaneous values. E  is a vector of parameters to be estimated, iD  
are unobserved individual random effects while itv  is the white noise error term, such 
that itv ~N(0,1) .   
Within this framework, it is possible to estimate the probabilities of boom or 
bust episodes conditional on the observable factors 'X 1it  as follows: 
                                                 ',,',X|Pr '' EE ttit XFy   11                                    (3)          
where F denotes the cumulative density function (c.d.f.) of normal standard 
distribution.  
The accuracy of the estimated probability can be evaluated by computing the 
quadratic probability score (QPS, henceforth).11 Let Pt be the probability of 
boom/bust during the next year, i.e.  ttt IyP |1Pr 1    , and Rt a dummy variable 
taking the value of one if the boom/bust occurs within the next year and zero 
otherwise. Then, the QLS is obtained as: 
                                ¦
 
 
T
t
tt RPTQPS 1
21                                                      (4) 
where the value ranges from 0 to 1, with a score of zero corresponding to perfect 
accuracy.  
 
4.2 Driving factors of housing markets 
Following the above-quoted empirical literature, a number of explanatory 
variables, 'itX , was considered in our analysis. As discussed in the robustness section, 
many variables were not significant while others were not included because of 
potential reverse-causality problems. Therefore, the final specification of our basic 
model includes the following set of controls:12 
x A set of variables (X1) reflecting economic fundamentals: 
Growth in per-capita real GDP may be related to house price deviations from trend 
especially if the persistence of such growth leads to the perception of higher life-time 
                                                 
11 See e.g. Diebold and Rudebusch (1989), Filardo (1994) and Layton (1998).  
12 See the Annex for the description of data sources.  
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income growth and, hence, the willingness of agents to take on more debt and spend a 
larger share of income on housing and related debt service. We may hence see higher 
growth of personal income being positively associated with a higher probability of a 
housing boom and lower growth with a higher probability of a bust.  
The level of short-term interest rates affects household debt financing conditions; an 
increase should decrease the probability of a boom and increase the one of a bust.13  
The growth rate of real credit to the private sector also mirrors households’ debt 
financing conditions and the degree of credit-rationing. Moreover, it could reflect the 
interaction between rising house prices and the availability of credit due to higher 
collateral values. More/less credit growth should hence be correlated with a higher 
boom/bust probability.  
The growth rate of global-liquidity variable aims to test for the role of international 
factors and notably cross-country spillovers via generously (or sparsely) available 
liquidity in other countries. We consider the growth rate of a “global” money 
aggregate computed as PPP-GDP weighted average of broad money growth for all 
sample countries, minus the corresponding national M3 aggregate.  
x A Demographic variable (X2) to account for related demand-side effects on real 
estate prices: 
The growth rate of working-age population may play a role in explaining housing 
demand and house prices over longer horizons, also given long supply lags in the 
construction sector. We expect that higher growth increases the likelihood of a boom. 
x A set of dummies (X3) controlling for the structural characteristic of local 
mortgage markets and the banking sector: 
A mortgage market deregulation dummy takes the value of one after the deregulation 
process has taken place in each country and zero otherwise. Deregulation should 
increase the probability of a subsequent boom. Until the 1980s, mortgage markets 
were, in general, highly regulated. Interest rate ceilings and quantitative limits on 
mortgage credit and repayment periods resulted in a chronic or temporary credit 
                                                 
13 We consider the nominal short-term interest rate instead of the real interest rate for two reasons. 
First, we expect that nominal interest rates directly reflect the direction of monetary policy. Secondly, 
as discussed by Sutton (2002) and Tsatsaronis and Zhou (2004, banks typically base their decision to 
grant a housing loan on the ratio of debt servicing costs to income. This ratio depends on the nominal 
and not the real interest rate. 
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rationing in the mortgage market and made it difficult for households to access credit 
(see e.g. Girouard and Blondal, 2001). The deregulation process which took place in 
the early to mid-1980s in many advanced economies heightened competition in the 
banking sector and broadened households’ access to mortgage credit (see Diamond 
and Lea, 1992).14 
Considering that the fragility of the banking sector is typically associated to 
drops in house prices, we introduced a banking crises dummy. We expect that the sign 
of the coefficient is positive during booms (when there are no banking crises) and 
negative during busts (which at times coincide with such crises).We use the 
information on banking crises that have occurred since 1970s (see e.g. Caprio and 
Klingebiel 1999; 2003 and Laeven and Valencia, 2008) to compute a binary variable 
that takes the value of one during the periods of financial crises and zero otherwise.  
We remark that, in order to avoid potential problems of endogeneity, all 
variables enter the Panel Probit model (2) with a lag.  
 
 
5. Empirical results 
The results of our model estimates broadly confirm the relevance of our 
variables for explaining both boom and bust episodes. Table 4 summarizes the main 
empirical findings. The overall model fit as reflected in the quadratic probability score 
is rather good for predicting both booms and busts. Column 1 reports the empirical 
relationship between economic fundamentals (X1) and the incidence of booms/busts 
one year later. We then broaden the analysis by including demographic (X2) and 
structural indicators (X3) in columns 2 and 3. 
Column 1 shows that all coefficients associated with the vector of controls X1 
are statistically significant and have the expected signs. Not surprisingly, a high level 
                                                 
14 As shown in Table 2 of the Annex, in the U.S., the deregulation of housing finance markets 
coincided with the phasing out of interest rate controls under Regulation Q in 1984 (Green and 
Wachter, 2007). In the U.K., deregulation occurred mainly through the abolition of credit controls (i.e. 
the “corset” was abolished in 1980). In Australia and Nordic countries, the deregulation process was 
relatively rapid and almost completed by the mid-1980s. By contrast, in some continental European 
countries (i.e. Italy) and Japan, the reform process started later and it was slower. Of particular 
importance from a policy perspective is the relationship between house prices and the local structural 
features of mortgage markets, i.e. the degree of access to the mortgage market and the flexibility of 
conditions under which credit becomes available. 
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of per capita GDP, a high level of liquidity (both at the local and “global” level) and 
lower interest rates increase (decrease) the likelihood of boom (bust) episodes.  
  Dependent variable: incidence of booms/busts in housing markets 
 Explanatory variables Models 
  Booms Busts 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Economic 
Fundamentals Lagged real per capita GDP (growth)  0.3646*** 0.3551*** 0.3480*** -0.1991*** -0.1746*** -0.1696*** 
  [0.0558] [0.0583] [0.0612] [0.0416] [0.0430] [0.0439] 
 Lagged short-term interest rate  -0.1435*** -0.1776*** -0.1403*** 0.0966*** 0.1243*** 0.1078*** 
  [0.0217] [0.0252] [0.0276] [0.0200] [0.0232] [0.0275] 
 Lagged local real credit (growth) 0.0236** 0.0224** 0.0247** -0.0451*** -0.0440*** -0.0386*** 
  [0.0098] [0.0102] [0.0121] [0.0135] [0.0136] [0.0138] 
 Lagged  Global liquidity (M3 growth) 0.2667*** 0.2460*** 0.2554*** -0.1876*** -0.1631*** -0.1736*** 
  [0.0618] [0.0637] [0.0662] [0.0577] [0.0591] [0.0604] 
Demographic Lagged population growth  0.9842*** 1.0257***  -0.6599** -0.5211* 
   [0.3238] [0.3703]  [0.2602] [0.2680] 
Structural 
indicators Deregulation (dummy)   0.5716*   -0.0778 
    [0.3156]   [0.2397] 
 Banking crises (dummy)   -1.2954***   0.6092*** 
    [0.3512]   [0.2280] 
 Pseudo R-square 0.26 0.27 0.31 0.22 0.24 0.25 
 Quadratic Probability Score (QPS)   0.38   0.36 
 
 Note: Sample 1980-2007. Panel Probit estimation. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
In the second column, we add the population growth variable (X2). This does 
not change the results concerning the importance of fundamentals variables which 
remain always statistically significant. We find that the level of working-age 
population matters as it increases housing demand that, in turn, pushes up real estate 
prices.  
Finally, the third column of Table 4 displays the estimation results including 
structural control variables (X3). The deregulation variable is statistically significant 
only in the boom model specification. The signs of the associated coefficients suggest 
that financial deregulation is significantly correlated with a sustained upswing of 
house prices. By contrast, it does not seem to play a role in explaining downturns in 
housing markets. Regarding the importance of the banking crises dummy, we find, as 
expected, that the higher the fragility of the local financial sector the higher (lower) 
the likelihood of bust (boom) episodes. Once again, the qualitative and quantitative 
role of the other variables remains unchanged. 
Table 4. Determinants of boom and bust phases in housing market 
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The findings in Table 4 allow us to move a step further and analyse the 
“success” of the estimated panel probit models in predicting boom and bust events for 
particular years and countries. The results are reported in Table 5 for booms and Table 
6 for busts. In these tables, the shaded area denotes the identified boom and bust 
periods while the years marked by x serve to count the number of correct and 
incorrect signals. Following Canova (1994), we discriminate between these signals by 
using a simple early warning rule: we assume that each boom/bust episode is correctly 
predicted (cells marked by xxx) if, at the time the event occurs, the associated 
estimated probability is above a conventional threshold value of fifty percent. By 
contrast, when the predicted probability is above the threshold and a boom/bust has 
not occurred we argue that the event is incorrectly predicted (cells marked by x) and 
we interpret the associated probability as a false signal. Given that this approach leads 
to a rather rough measure of the performance of the model, we also report the values 
of country-specific QPS indicators at the bottom of the Tables. 
 
Table 5. Boom predictions over the period 1982-2007          
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Table 6. Bust  predictions over the period 1982-2007 
 
 
The (overall) predictive power of the model is relatively good as can be seen 
by the low QPS values and the rather large number of shaded cells correctly 
identified. However, there is also considerable heterogeneity in the performance of the 
model which may reflect the fact that housing markets are distinguished markedly by 
idiosyncratic local factors (see IMF, 2004).  
 For most countries, the model is performing well in predicting booms and the 
number of false signals is limited. In fact, probabilities exceed the threshold in most 
cases at the latest by the third boom year and in some cases already in the first year. 
This suggests a good performance of the model as an early warning device for the 
identification of booms. Incorrect boom signals occurred in the late 1980s for Ireland 
and Netherlands. More recently, false boom signals for Ireland and Norway need to be 
interpreted cautiously in light of the fact that in these countries, a very drawn out 
house price boom was shortly interrupted during the early 2000s so that the latter 
years do not qualify as a boom by our method. The model also predicts correctly the 
majority of busts with the exception of Germany (not at all) and Japan (only late in 
the bust).  
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Table 7a. Boom and bust probabilities in 2008 
Countries 
experiencing booms 
Predicted 
boom 
probabilities 
for 2008 
Predicted 
bust 
probabilities 
for 2008 
G-3 countries   
United Kingdom 0.27 0.17 
Japan 0.35 0.16 
United States 0.12 0.28 
Nordic Countries 
Norway 0.77 0.09 
Denmark 0.55 0.10 
Finland 0.84 0.05 
Ireland 0.89 0.03 
Netherlands 0.81 0.04 
Sweden 0.77 0.06 
Euro countries  
France 0.65 0.08 
Italy 0.45 0.13 
Spain 0.67 0.07 
 
Switzerland 0.83 0.05 
   
Average  overall 0.61 0.10 
 
Another interesting issue is the identification of turning points from booms to 
busts. In this regard, Table 7a shows the predicted boom and bust probabilities for 
2008 on the basis of 2007 data. This has to be seen against the background of 2008 
already appearing during the course of that year as a turning point in house prices in 
many countries and as the first year of a potential bust in the US and UK. Table 7a, 
however, still shows often rather high boom probabilities and low figures only for the 
US and the UK. The predicted probability of 2008 potentially being the first year of a 
bust is low even for the UK and US. The model hence does not seem to be very 
powerful in explaining turning points. This assessment is also underpinned by the fact 
that the first bust year would also not have been predicted with a high probability in 
the past either (see Table 6).  
So far, we have analysed the accuracy of prediction for our model (2) using in-
sample techniques (see Table 5-7a). In order to investigate its out-of-sample 
performances, we conduct a forecasting experiment based on a recursive scheme. 
Specifically, after estimating recursively the Panel Probit model, we compute, for 
each countries, multi-period ahead forecasts of booms and busts. We start to estimate 
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the model over the sample period 1980-200015 and then, we calculate the out-of-
sample predictions for 2001 through 2007. To save space, we report, in table 7b, 
results from this forecasting exercise only for the boom model.16 The shaded cells are 
denoted years for which out-of-sample predictions are computed. The years marked 
by XXX serve to count the number of correctly predicted booms while years marked 
by X count the number of false signals. 
By comparing results with those reported in Table 5, we see that the predictive 
content of our model is stable over time, i.e. in-sample booms predictions match quite 
well those obtained with different horizon. In addition, we note that, predictive 
performance across countries are heterogeneous as in Table 5 thereby suggesting, 
once again, that our model is unable to achieve full prediction accuracy in predicting 
booms for all countries. 
 Table 7b. Out-of sample performances 
Note: Grey cells denote the years for which out-of-sample predictions are computed. Cells marked by XXX indicate that booms 
are correctly predicted (probability higher that 50%). Cells marked by X indicate false signals (i.e. the estimated probability is 
higher than 50% but the boom doesn’t occur).  
                                                  
15 Because of the short length of our sample, we consider 20 years as the minimum number of 
observations to obtain initial reliable parameter estimates.   
16 We note that results from bust model are available upon request. However, these latter are less 
interesting for evaluation purposes given that, over the horizon 2001-2007, only Japan and Germany 
experienced bust episodes. 
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5.1. Elasticities of explanatory variables
The estimated structural parameters of our model as reported in Table 4, do 
not allow measuring the sensitivity of the probabilities of booms and busts to 
marginal changes in each observable explanatory variable. In order to address this 
question, we compute the marginal effects (elasticities) of specific changes in each 
regressor Xi X of the model on the response conditional probability as follows: 
                                    jii
ij
ij fFXXe '
'' EEE XX  w
w                                    (5) 
where ijX  is the jth element of 'iX  while f is the derivative of the c.d.f. F.  
The convention is to compute these quantities from the cumulative standard 
distribution F( ) at the means of the independent variables 'iX . However, from an 
economic point of view, it is also interesting to compute the elasticities at specific 
periods t.  
 
 
 At means  
 Booms Busts 
   
Real per capita GDP (growth)  0.1156*** -0.0536*** 
 [0.0231] [0.0145] 
Short-term interest rate  -0.0466*** 0.0340*** 
 [0.0105] [0.0086] 
Local real credit (growth) 0.0082** -0.0122*** 
 [0.0042] [0.0043] 
Global liquidity (M3 growth) 0.0848*** -0.0548*** 
  [0.0240] [0.0195] 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Table 8. Analysis of Marginal Effects (Elasticities) 
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We provide an estimate of the (overall) sensitivity of the probabilities of 
booms and busts to changes in the core set of economic fundamentals, during the 
whole period 1982-2007 in Table 8. In the first column, we report the marginal effects 
evaluated at the averages values of the independent variables for boom periods; the 
second one reports elasticities during busts. Elasticities range from about 0.01 for 
local liquidity, via about 0.05 for interest rates to about 0.1 for global liquidity and 
real per capita growth. For comparative purposes, Figure 4 shows, for a set of 
variables, the absolute values of elasticities during boom and bust phases. We find 
that with the exception of the growth rate of local credit, the sensitivities of the 
conditional probabilities are higher during boom phases. 
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09
Global Liquidity (M3 grow th)
Local credit (grow th)
short-term interest rate
 
                                                           Note: Grey bars denote boom periods while black bars denote bust periods.. 
 
As elasticities are not equal in all years, Figure 5 illustrates the pattern of 
elasticities for booms over the entire sample period graphically. We note that 
elasticities as regards the probability of a boom were very low in the early 1990s 
when many countries experienced a synchronous slump. The size of boom-related 
elasticities experienced a first peak in the late 1980s and then again towards the late 
1990s after which they remained relatively stable.  
We conclude this section by synthesising the findings on identifying booms 
and bust episodes and on the elasticities of independent variables on predicted 
probabilities. On the left of Table 9, we report the predicted boom probabilities for 
2000 (based on 1999 data which in principle was available in spring 2000).  
Figure 4. Comparison between the size of  elasticities (at means) 
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model
Note:  Dark and light shaded area denote periods characterized by the largest number of contemporaneous busts and booms, 
respectively. 
 
The Table clearly shows that most countries were seen as experiencing a real 
estate boom with at least a 50% probability. Already in spring 2000, this probability 
was seen at 76% in the US, at 68% in the UK or at 84% in Spain. Unsurprisingly, 
Japan was identified as distinctly not experiencing a boom. The subsequent columns 
show that an interest rate increase by 1pp in 1999 would have reduced this probability 
by 0.04. A 1 pp reduction in global and local liquidity growth would have reduced the 
probability by 7% and 1% respectively.  
Estimated boom probabilities remained very high during the following years 
right until 2008 as we had seen before. In early 2005, on the basis of 2004 data, a 
boom probability above 50% would have continued to been seen for most countries 
(right side of Table 9). The elasticities of interest rates and liquidity growth were 
estimated to be slightly higher than in 2000.  
Figure 5. Elasticities  during the periods 1982-2007 from Boom-Probit 
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Table 9. Changes in the predicted probabilities of a boom in 2000 and 2005 following a policy change (shock) 
 
 Simulated shocks in 1999 
Countries 
Predicted 
boom 
probabilities 
for 2000 
Interest 
rate 
+1% 
Global 
liquidity 
-1% 
Local 
liquidity 
-1% 
     
United Kingdom 0.68 -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 
Japan 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
United States 0.76 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 
Canada 0.84 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 
Australia 0.64 -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 
New Zealand 0.82 -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 
Switzerland 0.51 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 
Norway 0.31 -0.05 -0.08 -0.01 
Denmark 0.46 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 
Finland 0.83 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 
Ireland 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Netherlands 0.79 -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 
Sweden 0.94 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 
France 0.63 -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 
Italy 0.55 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 
Spain 0.84 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 
Average overall 0.66 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01  
Simulated shocks in 2004 
Countries 
Predicted 
boom 
probabilities 
for 2005 
Interest 
rate 
+1% 
Global 
liquidity 
-1% 
Local 
liquidity 
-1% 
     
United Kingdom 0.56 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 
Japan 0.10 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 
United States 0.80 -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 
Canada 0.64 -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 
Australia 0.36 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 
New Zealand 0.54 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 
Switzerland 0.65 -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 
Norway 0.77 -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 
Denmark 0.49 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 
Finland 0.69 -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 
Ireland 0.82 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 
Netherlands 0.49 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 
Sweden 0.82 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 
France 0.51 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 
Italy 0.23 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 
Spain 0.58 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 
Average overall 0.58 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01  
 
 Boom model Bust model  
Lagged real per capita GDP (growth)  0.5029*** -0.2347*** 
 [0.0903] [0.0472] 
Lagged short-term interest rate  -0.1392*** 0.1202*** 
 [0.0276] [0.0214] 
Lagged local liquidity  (M3 growth) 0.0464* -0.0487** 
 [0.0245] [0.0227] 
Lagged US liquidity (M3 growth) 0.1416*** -0.0642* 
 [0.0398] [0.0329] 
Lagged EU liquidity (M3 growth) 0.069 -0.0983 
 [0.0776] [0.0683] 
Pseudo R-square 0.31 0.25 
 
 Note: Sample EU countries, 1980-2007. Panel Probit estimation. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
Finally, we further divide the global money variable into a US variable and a 
non-local EU money growth variable. The key results for a panel including only EU 
countries are presented in Table 10. We note that, although the parameters associated 
with all monetary variables have the correct signs, only US and local money have a 
significant effect on both boom and bust probabilities.  
 
Table 10. Impact of US liquidity on booms and busts in EU countries
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6. Robustness checks 
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our empirical findings in 
several directions. First we check whether our estimation results are robust to the 
inclusion of additional control variables. Specifically, we are interested to test whether 
the omission of economic variables, which might influence house price dynamics, 
may impact on the determination of the probabilities of booms and busts. In 
particular, we control for the following set of (lagged) variables: 
x The growth rate of stock prices index. This variable aims to capture the impact of 
fluctuations in households’ financial wealth induced by changes in equity prices 
that, in turn, could spill over into housing demand and, hence, booms/busts (see 
Borio and McGuire, 2004; Van den End and Kakes, 2002). The sign of the 
coefficient, however, could also go in the opposite direction as stocks may be a 
competing asset with housing in households’ portfolio.  
x The change in tax on property (as percentage of GDP). We expect that a more 
favourable tax treatment of housing for home ownership is reflected in a low user 
cost of capital implying a strong incentive to invest in housing (see also Van den 
Noord, 2005).  
x The Real Effective Exchange rate (REER). By including this variable, we explore 
the role of the competitiveness and trade channel in determining the probabilities 
of boom/bust episodes. We expect that in a context of depreciation/devaluation, a 
higher level of competitiveness may stimulate the housing demand. 
x Fiscal balance (percentage of real GDP).  The role of public finances is little 
discussed in literature. By controlling for the fiscal channel, we examine whether 
fiscal policies may exacerbate boom-bust phases. However, we note that the 
expected effects are not so clear. In fact, we should expect that a higher deficit 
increases the level of the markets’ uncertainty thereby increasing the probabilities 
of busts episodes. On the other hand, a worsening of public finances might be 
associated with deficit-spending policies adopted by national governments to 
stimulate the economy. In this case, we expect an opposite effect: and increase in 
housing inflation.  
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Second, we test for the robustness of our results to alternative measure of 
domestic liquidity. Specifically, we re-estimate the baseline model (2) by replacing, 
for each country, credit growth to private sector with the growth rate of national broad 
money. 
Finally, in order to validate our model specification, we compare the 
prediction accuracy of the Panel probit model (2) with those of other alternative 
models. In particular, we are interested to check whether more parsimonious 
specifications perform better than our model. 
 
 Dependent variable: incidence of booms in housing markets 
 Models 
 Baseline (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged real per capita GDP (growth)  0.3480*** 0.3551*** 0.3476*** 0.3415*** 0.3826*** 0.3983*** 
 [0.0612] [0.0639] [0.0614] [0.0621] [0.0651] [0.0650] 
Lagged short-term interest rate  -0.1403*** -0.1422*** -0.1403*** -0.1407*** -0.1435*** -0.1457*** 
 [0.0276] [0.0281] [0.0276] [0.0276] [0.0302] [0.0284] 
Lagged local  credit (growth) 0.0247** 0.0246** 0.0247** 0.0247** 0.0245* - 
 [0.0121] [0.0120] [0.0121] [0.0121] [0.0130] - 
Lagged Global liquidity  (M3 growth) 0.2554*** 0.2506*** 0.2557*** 0.2530*** 0.2679*** 0.2642*** 
 [0.0662] [0.0672] [0.0663] [0.0663] [0.0692] [0.0656] 
Lagged population growth 1.0257*** 1.0255*** 1.0240*** 1.0422*** 0.9357** 1.0162*** 
 [0.3703] [0.3711] [0.3708] [0.3717] [0.3948] [0.3689] 
Deregulation (dummy) 0.5716* 0.5462* 0.5708* 0.5969* 0.5477* 0.5848* 
 [0.3156] [0.3220] [0.3158] [0.3184] [0.3277] [0.3201] 
Banking crises (dummy) -1.2954*** -1.3015*** -1.2953*** -1.2967*** -1.3773*** -1.2949*** 
 [0.3512] [0.3521] [0.3511] [0.3488] [0.3648] [0.3499] 
Lagged local M3 (growth)      0.0436** 
      [0.0197] 
Lagged Real Stock price (growth)  -0.0019     
  [0.0047]     
Lagged change in tax on property    -0.0007    
   [0.0082]    
Lagged REER    -0.0039   
    [0.0068]   
Lagged Fiscal Balance (%GDP)     -0.0216  
     [0.0277]  
Pseudo R-square 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
      Note: Panel Probit estimation. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Results from the first two robustness checks are reported in Tables 11a and 
11b. As shown in column (1)-(5), none of the additional controls enter in a 
statistically significant way in our model with exception of the lagged fiscal balance. 
This variable is significant (with a negative sign) only in the bust model. However, as 
Table 11a. Check for alternative and additional control variables. Boom model 
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discussed above, the interpretation is not clear-cut. Furthermore, from an econometric 
point of view, the inclusion of this variable is not recommended due to potential 
endogeneity problems.17 Column 6 reports the parameter estimate of model (2) when 
the growth rate of M3 to GDP replaces the credit growth rate variable. We find that 
the coefficients associated with both the two variables are qualitatively and 
quantitatively the same and the goodness of fit remains unchanged.  
 
 Dependent variable: incidence of busts in housing markets 
 Models 
 Baseline (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged real per capita GDP (growth)  -0.1696*** -0.1652*** -0.1696*** -0.1611*** -0.1645*** -0.2192*** 
 [0.0439] [0.0450] [0.0439] [0.0454] [0.0451] [0.0436] 
Lagged short-term interest rate  0.1078*** 0.1052*** 0.1083*** 0.1128*** 0.1010*** 0.1005*** 
 [0.0275] [0.0281] [0.0276] [0.0289] [0.0275] [0.0277] 
Lagged local  credit (growth) -0.0386*** -0.0388*** -0.0389*** -0.0400*** -0.0265** - 
 [0.0138] [0.0138] [0.0139] [0.0143] [0.0132] - 
Lagged Global liquidity  (M3 growth) -0.1736*** -0.1768*** -0.1738*** -0.1700*** -0.1627*** -0.1831*** 
 [0.0604] [0.0608] [0.0605] [0.0612] [0.0618] [0.0584] 
Lagged population growth -0.5211* -0.5172* -0.5217* -0.5774** -0.4928* -0.4278 
 [0.2680] [0.2681] [0.2681] [0.2807] [0.2799] [0.2646] 
Deregulation (dummy) -0.0778 -0.0978 -0.0746 -0.1123 -0.0094 -0.0655 
 [0.2397] [0.2433] [0.2405] [0.2499] [0.2448] [0.2421] 
Banking crises (dummy) 0.6092*** 0.6079*** 0.6097*** 0.6126*** 0.5281** 0.7555*** 
 [0.2280] [0.2280] [0.2281] [0.2330] [0.2313] [0.2244] 
Lagged local M3 (growth)      -0.0423** 
      [0.0188] 
Lagged Real Stock price (growth)  -0.0018     
  [0.0043]     
Lagged change in tax on property    0.0015    
   [0.0077]    
Lagged REER    0.0064   
    [0.0075]   
Lagged Fiscal Balance (%GDP)     -0.0594**  
     [0.0252]  
Pseudo R-square 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 
Note: Panel Probit estimation. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
To compare the performance of our model with those of simpler ones,  we 
report in Table 12a and 12b, the quadratic probability score (QPS) computed from 
alternative specifications, each of which include on the right-side only at most two 
lags of an economic variable entering the model (2). By comparing the QPS from the 
baseline model (first row of table 12a and 12b) with those from the simpler models, 
                                                 
17 Considering that both boom and bust periods impact on Real GDP, it is difficult to assume that the 
‘causality’ direction works only from deficit to economic developments and not vice versa.  
Table 11b. Check for alternative and additional control variables. Bust model 
40
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1071
July 2009
we conclude that, for the majority of countries, the predictive accuracy of our 
specification is higher than that of simpler models. Overall, our model ensures the 
higher probability to correctly predict booms and busts as well as the lower 
probability to send incorrect signals.  
Model specifications GB JP US CA AU NZ CH NO DK FI IE NL FR IT ES SE 
Baseline  0.19 0.05 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.13 0.35 0.23 0.13 0.31 0.15 0.12
Real per capita GDP growth (1) 0.21 0.12 0.24 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.15 0.23 0.31 0.21 0.25
Real per capita GDP growth (1,2) 0.21 0.10 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.27 0.14 0.23 0.31 0.19 0.22
Short-term interest rate (1) 0.32 0.37 0.18 0.21 0.14 0.13 0.30 0.17 0.30 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.13 0.24 0.27 0.20
Short-term interest rate (1,2) 0.32 0.37 0.18 0.21 0.14 0.13 0.31 0.17 0.31 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.13 0.24 0.27 0.19
Local  credit growth (1) 0.26 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.25
Local  credit growth (1,2) 0.25 0.17 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.24
Global liquidity growth (1) 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.26 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.26 0.23 0.26
Global liquidity growth (1,2) 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.26
Note: Each row reports results from different specifications. Baseline refers to model specification including all the explanatory variables as reported in table 
4.  Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of lagged values used for each variables. Lowest QLS values in bold.   
Model specifications GB JP US CH NO DK FI IE NL DE FR IT ES BE SE 
Baseline 0.10 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.28 0.13 0.13 0.20 0.11 0.13
Real per capita GDP growth (1) 0.17 0.25 0.21 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.18 0.14 0.16
Real per capita GDP growth (1,2) 0.17 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.22 0.25 0.19 0.14 0.15
Short-term interest rate (1) 0.19 0.48 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.27 0.19 0.17 0.25 0.09 0.14
Short-term interest rate (1,2) 0.19 0.48 0.25 0.26 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.28 0.18 0.16 0.24 0.09 0.14
Local  credit growth (1) 0.17 0.26 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.20
Local  credit growth (1,2) 0.16 0.25 0.17 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.20
Global liquidity growth (1) 0.17 0.30 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.17 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.17 0.17 0.19
Global liquidity growth (1,2) 0.16 0.31 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.14 0.20 0.16 0.26 0.21 0.22 0.14 0.16 0.19
Note: Each row reports results from different specifications. Baseline refers to model specification including all the explanatory variables as reported in 
table 4.  Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of lagged values used for each variables. Lowest QLS values in bold.   
 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks
This study looks at real estate price booms and busts in industrialized 
countries. The analysis of these episodes, from an historical and econometric 
perspective, leads to some interesting conclusions: 1) the most recent housing booms 
have been amongst the longest in the past 40 years with similarly strong deviations in 
house prices from long term trends as in past booms; 2) In the past, there has been a 
strong correlation between the persistence and magnitude of booms and those of 
subsequent busts; 3) we find that the economic costs (in terms of GDP losses during 
Table 12a. QLS indicators from alternative specifications. Boom  model 
0.17
Table 12b. QLS indicators from alternative specifications. Bust  model 
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the post-boom phase) depend significantly on the magnitude of the boom and money 
and credit developments during the boom; 4) The estimated elasticities computed 
from the Panel Probit model, suggest that notably short term interest rates, local and 
global money/credit and the incidence of mortgage market deregulation affect 
significantly the probability of experiencing booms and busts; and 5) our model is 
quite successful in identifying booms and busts already early on.  
We find that the abovementioned empirical findings provide useful indications 
and plausible “rules of thumb” that should be regarded as part of the information set 
of the monetary and regulatory policy makers who take into account (emerging) 
housing booms in their assessment. First, our results suggest that a probabilistic 
identification of booms and busts relatively early on in such phases seems possible on 
the basis of our model. The contrary has been claimed by some observers and policy 
makers in the past. Second, interest rate policies directly or indirectly (via its effect on 
money and credit) can have a significant influence on the probability of booms and 
busts occurring. Regulatory policies that slow down money and credit growth are also 
expected to curtail boom probabilities. Finally, the importance of global liquidity 
suggests that cross-border externalities of overly lax policies in boom periods may be 
significant. 
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Annex:
Annex Table 1. Economic Variables 
 Sources 
Housing price series Bank of International Settlement (BIS) 
Real GDP per capita  AMECO dataset 
Short-term interest rate Economic Outlook (OECD) 
Credit to private sector International Monetary Fund (IFS) 
Broad Money (M3) ECB dataset and Economic Outlook (OECD) 
PPP share weights of the world World Economic Outlook (IMF) 
Working-age population AMECO dataset 
Stock price index International Monetary Fund (IFS) 
Taxes on property Economic Outlook (OECD Tax Database) 
Real Effective Exchange Rate (ULC based) AMECO dataset 
Fiscal balance  AMECO dataset 
 
 
Annex Table 2. Selected financial deregulation and liberalization measures affecting the housing market 
 
Country Date Type of measurement 
Australia 1986 Deregulation of interest rates; Removal of ceilings on mortgage interest rate. 
Belgium 1992 Deregulation of interest rates, introduction of variable interest rate loans and reduction of the maximum early repayment fee. 
Canada 1967 Deregulation of interest rates and relaxation of limits on bank borrowing; Restrictions on banks’ participation in mortgage financing abolished 
Denmark 1991 Elimination of restrictions on mortgage bond issuance and implementation of the Second Banking Directive (89/646/EEC)  
Finland 1986 Deregulation of interest rates; lifting of quantitative credit controls; Funding quotas from the Central Bank to commercial banks eliminated 
France 1987 Lifting of credit controls; Bank specialisation requirement reduced 
Germany 1967 Deregulation of interest rates 
Ireland 1985 Deregulation of interest rates 
Italy 1988 Permanent lifting of quantitative credit controls (credit ceilings eliminated*) 
Japan 1994 Complete deregulation of interest rates; Bank specialisation requirements reduced 
Netherlands 1980 Deregulation of interest rates 
New Zealand 1984 Deregulation of interest rates and lifting of components of credit controls (credit allocations guidelines removed) 
Norway 1985 Deregulation of interest rates and lifting of components of credit controls (lending controls abolished) 
Spain 1987 Deregulation of interest rates 
Sweden 1985 Deregulation of interest rates and relaxation of limits of credit controls (lending controls abolished) 
Switzerland 1977 Advanced deregulation of the financial sector 
United Kingdom 1986 
Authorisation granted to building societies to extend their activity to 
mortgage loans; Lifting of mortgage credit control (guidelines on 
mortgage lending removed) 
United States 1984 Deregulation of interest rates; Removal of Regulation Q and elimination of portfolio restrictions for thrifts. 
Note: sources Debelle (2004), ECB (2003), Girouad and Blondal (2001), Mehrez and Kaufmann (1999). The 
dummy variable that indicates the deregulation of mortgage lending takes the value one after the date this 
measure was applied in each country. * Officially, credit ceilings were eliminated in 1983 but they were 
temporary re-imposed during the years 1986-1987. 
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Annex Table 3: Episodes of banking crises 
 
Country Date Most relevant episodes 
Australia 1989-1992 Two large banks received capital from government to cover losses. Non-performing loans rose to 6 percent of total assets in 1991-92. 
Belgium -  
Canada 1983-1985 Fifteen members of the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation, including two banks, failed. 
Denmark 1987-1992 Cumulative loan losses over the period 1990-1992 were 9 percent of loans; 40 of the 60 problem banks were merged. 
Finland 1991-1994 Savings banking sector badly affected; Government took control of three banks that together accounted for 31 percent of total system deposits. 
France 1994-1995 Credit Lyonnais crises 
Germany Late 1970s So called Giroinstitutions faced problems. 
Ireland - - 
Italy 1990-1995 During 1990-1994, 58 banks (accounting for 11 percent of total lending) were merged with other institutions. 
Japan 1997-2007 
Banks suffering from sharp decline in stock market and real estate prices; official estimate of 
NPLs: 40 trillion Yen (USD 469 billion) in 1995 (10 percent of GDP); unofficial estimates put 
NPLs at 1 trillion or 25 percent of GDP; for some of bad loans, banks have already made 
provisions. At end 1998, total banking system NPLs estimated at Yen 87.5 trillion (USD 725 
billion), about 17.9 percent of GDP. In March 1999, Hakkaido Takushodu bank closed, Long 
Term Credit Bank nationalized; Yatsuda Trust merged with Fuji Bank, and Mitsui Trust 
merged with Chuo Trust. 
Netherlands - - 
New Zealand 1987-1990 One large state-owned bank accounting for one-fourth of banking assets experienced serious solvency problems due to high NPLs. 
Norway 1991-1993 
Central Bank provided special loans to six banks, suffering from post-oil recession of 1985-86 
and from problem real estate loans; state took control of three largest banks (equivalent to 85 
percent of banking system assets, whose loan losses had wiped out capital), partly through a 
Government Bank Investment Fund (Nkr 5 billion) and the state-backed Bank Insurance Fund 
had to increase capital to Nkr 11 billion. 
Spain 1977-1985 
During 1978-83, 24 institutions were rescued; four were liquidated, four were merged and 20 
small/medium sized banks (Rumasa Group) were nationalized. In total, 52 out of 110 banks 
were experiencing solvency problems, representing 20 percent of total banking system 
deposits. 
Sweden 1991-1994 
Nordbanken and Gota Bank insolvent, accounting for 21.6 percent of total banking system 
assets. Sparbanken Foresta intervened, accounting for 24 percent of total banking system 
assets. Overall, five of six largest banks, accounting for over 70 percent of banking system 
assets experienced difficulties. 
Switzerland - - 
United 
Kingdom 
1974-1976, 
1984, 1991, 
1995, 2007 
Secondary banking crises (1974); notable bank failures included Johnson Matthey (1984); 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (1991) and Barings (1995) 
United States 1984-1991; 2007 More than 1,400 savings & loans and 1,300 banks failed. 
   
Note: sources Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Laeven and Valencia (2008). 
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